O grupo de escritos chamados Cartas Católicas, junto à chamada Carta aos Hebreus apresenta-se como um testemunho extra-paulino do Cristianismo primitivo. De fato, é o conjunto dos textos narrativos (Evangelhos e Atos) e do Corpus Paulinum (conjunto dos escritos atribuídos a Paulo) que são mais marcantes na compreensão do Evento Jesus Cristo e sua vivência e compreensão no primeiro século. Com frequência, se esquece que o Cristianismo é um fenômeno histórico e social plural. Uma pequena introdução a este tempo histórico (...) e à sua temática é sempre oportuna para compreender as raízes da Igreja. (shrink)

Os dois primeiros capítulos dos Evangelhos canônicos de Mateus e Lucas têm dois conceitos teológicos que precisam ser mais investigados. Trata-se de “justiça” e “virgindade”, que podem ser entendidos como “tópoi”, isto é, palavras ou conceitos muito especiais. A tentativa desde artigo é abrir o debate a respeito e propor uma nova leitura dos relatos de Anunciação, desta-cando as figuras fundamentais de José e Maria, referências específicas de Jesus: sua messiani-dade e sua humanidade.

Las referencias de Michel Foucault a la noción de ideología no han sidotan numerosas. Luego de unas pocas líneas dedicadas en la primera de lasconferencias de La verdad y las formas jurídicas, en una entrevista publicadaen 1977 manifestó su incomodidad con el concepto de ideología, entreotras dos razones, por las implicancias con una noción clásica de sujeto.Por otra parte, y de modo sorpresivo, en algunos trabajos tales como ¿Quées la crítica?, analizó la noción de crítica. Lo que me interesa indagar (...) essi al momento de conceptualizar la crítica, Foucault mantiene la mismaconceptualización de la subjetividad que cuando reprochaba el conceptode ideología. (shrink)

Em uma nota originalmente publicada em 1974 somente em italiano, Gilles Deleuze cunhou a expressão filosofia-cinema, aparentemente significando um novo estilo de fazer filosofia, a ser desenvolvido sob a luz das novidades do cinema. A fim de melhor entender o que uma “filosofia-cinema” poderia ser, antes de tudo devemos imaginar o que seria uma “filosofia antiquada”. Proponho caracterizá-la como uma “filosofia-pintura” baseada na noção de “representação”. Por sua vez, essa noção sugere uma concepção peculiar de visão baseada no modelo ótico (...) de “janela”, introduzido na pintura por Leon Battista Alberti e usado também na filosofia moderna. Esse modelo ainda funciona em nossa época? Apesar de numerosas referências recentes ao modelo janela, em minha opinião o modelo na ativa atualmente é aquele da “tela”. É claro que nossas relações diante das telas das mídias eletrônicas de hoje são diferentes daquele relacionamento que mantemos com a tela cinematográfica. Todavia, acho que esta última é a predecessora mais próxima dos modelos anteriores. De modo a entender os componentes da continuidade e da descontinuidade entre esses dois tipos de relacionamento, engajei-me numa investigação dos dois caminhos respectivos para mostrar o sonho de viver em uma tela. De fato, acho que esta investigação pode nos fornecer elementos importantes que permitam o desenvolvimento de uma “cinema-filosofia” na escala de hoje. (shrink)

Toujours déjà expressif, habité par la dimension du langage au moment même de l'expérience, le "visuel" est un champ à part entière où se croisent réel et imaginaire, et donc une nouvelle forme de compréhension de notre rapport au monde. En ce sens, les derniers travaux de Merleau-Ponty, par leur réflexion sur la question du visuel, remettent en cause la plupart des catégories par lesquelles nous avons coutume de "nommer" notre rapport au monde. Cette problématique se révèle particulièrement importante aujourd'hui. (...) Le développement continu des technologies optiques et médiatiques ne cesse d'ouvrir nos existences à des formes inédites de visualisation et d'expérience, et impose une compréhension renouvelée du statut contemporain des images. Convaincus que la pensée du dernier Merleau-Ponty peut contribuer de manière décisive à saisir ces enjeux, les dix auteurs des interventions recueillies dans ce volume des philosophes ainsi que des spécialistes internationaux des médias provenant de cinq pays différents proposent une réflexion collective particulièrement homogène et novatrice autour des croisements entre les notions de "visible" et de "visuel"."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

It would make a wonderful musical study – perhaps someone has already done it – to compare the various operatic and instrumental versions of the famous myth of Orpheus and Eurydice. [...] We know all too well the anxiety question par excellence, the disquieting “ Che vuoi? ” traversing our symbolically embedded lives. So, let me indulge a bit in this uncanny zone and ask: “ Che vogliamo? ”, what is our goal with this issue? Why did we start this (...) project? To be honest, I’m more than uncomfortable with this question, as it pushes me dangerously close to the awkward regions of the Lacanian “ Moi, la vérité, je parle ”. Nevertheless, for the greater good let me play this role for a little while and do my best to outline an answer. (shrink)

En este breve comentario discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación de la epistemología de Davidson que sugiere Willian Duica en su reciente libro. Luego de una presentación somera del libro me centro en tres asuntos centrales de la interpretación de Duica. En primer lugar, argumento que su lectura de la crítica de Davidson al dualismo esquema/contenido es muy restrictiva y deja abierta la posibilidad de un realismo directo empirista. En segundo lugar, argumento que en su lectura el propio Duica se (...) compromete inadvertidamente con un empirismo de este tipo y, de este modo, su interpretación entra en tensión con el coherentismo de Davidson. Finalmente, discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación que hace Duica de la tesis davidsoniana de la triangulación. In this short comment I discuss some aspects of William Duica's interpretation of Davidson's epistemology in a recent book. After a brief review of the book, I focus on three central issues of Duica's interpretation. First, I argue that his reading of Davidson's criticism of the scheme/content dualism is too restrictive and leaves open the possibility of an empiricist direct realism. Second, I argue in his reading Duica inadvertently commits himself to an empiricism of this sort and, as a result, his interpretation is in tension with Davidson's own coherentism. Finally, I discuss some aspects of Duica's interpretation of Davidsonian triangulation. (shrink)

Dans ses efforts pour la renaissance et la reconnaissance de l'Afrique, Léopold Sédar Senghor a élaboré une philosophie de l'art fondée sur l'identification des paradigmes inhérents au style afro-diasporique : le génie du rythme et l'hégémonie du mouvement, source d'un négro-orphisme où l'émotion apparaît consubstantielle de la commotion. S'inscrivant dans la continuité de la pensée senghorienne, le présent ouvrage met en place la théorie d'une esthétique kinésique et tente de l'appliquer à l'étude des pratiques oratoires, musicales, sportives, chorégraphiques afro-diasporiques. Il (...) montre comment l'idiosyncrasie africaine a servi de matrice à de nouveaux langages plastiques et musicaux tant en Europe qu'aux Amériques. Il en est ainsi de la geste jazzistique de Wynton Marsalis, examinée ici en lien avec la statuaire oraculaire nkisi nkondi du Congo, les polyphonies des peuples "pygmées", le bwiti et le mvet, culte et art verbal d'Afrique centrale. L'esthétique du jazz, du basket-ball, du hip-hop, des cultes religieux et des musiques diasporiques se rattache essentiellement à l'Afrique noire par la virtuosité expressive, la vitalité kinesthésique et la démocratisation du rythme. Libératrice, jouissive, délice dionysiaque, elle traduit le goût, la passion d'exister ainsi que la faculté de résistance d'une sensibilité culturelle qui a su surmonter les tragédies de l'Histoire avant de trouver de nouvelles voies de régénération et de dissémination dans le corps et l'âme des sociétés postmodernes. (shrink)

América Latina: un ejercicio de la imaginación Hace algunas semanas mi hija, que está cursando sexto grado de la escuela primaria en Argentina, me dijo que la docente de Ciencias les había pedido a sus estudiantes que llevaran para la clase siguiente un mapa de América Latina. Me sorprendió; no recordaba haber visto un mapa de América Latina. Los mapas que generalmente se utilizan en la escuela son los del continente americano y luego los que sectorizan América del norte, central (...) y del sur.... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Normalization and the Welfare StateLadelle McWhorterIn Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo-America, I argued that as race was absorbed into biology in the nineteenth century, it was recast from a morphological typology to a function of physiological and evolutionary development (McWhorter 2009b). Racial difference became a sign of developmental difference. Racial groups represented stages of human evolution, and raced individuals were to be disciplined and managed in accordance with (...) developmental norms.Twentieth-century race was therefore a category and tool of normalization; to be raced was to be located at a particular point along a developmental curve. Some races were thought to be more or less arrested in their development, while others were merely retarded, and theorists disagreed at times about which were which. But they all agreed that the most highly developed race was the Nordic or the Anglo-Saxon. Anglo-Saxons were the norm for modern human beings— anatomically, physiologically, intellectually, and morally. There were other white races whose status was debated (Mediterraneans and Ashkenazi Jews, for example), and there were disputes over the evolutionary status of Chinese, Hindus, and Mexicans. But most theorists agreed that at the very bottom of the developmental scale we should place Celts, Negroes, and American Indians. These peoples were savages, primitives. They should be trained to the extent possible to contribute to the society that had already superseded them, but their proper destiny was to pass away into extinction as humanity advanced.These evolutionary stragglers, along with the evolutionary throwbacks that appeared sometimes among whites, were considered dangerous for two main reasons. First, a great many of them were expensive. They were shiftless, often incompetent, and frequently lawless. Because of them, it was necessary to [End Page 39] maintain police forces, prisons, poorhouses, and asylums. They were a drain on the economic advance of society, which affected its educational and technological advance and ultimately its evolutionary advance as well. Second, because they had primitive sexual urges unrestrained by reason as well as heritable defects and diseases, they threatened the bloodlines of more advanced human beings. In short, they posed a risk for the ongoing evolutionary advancement of the entire Human Race. To protect the Race, it was necessary to contain these primitives, savages, and throwbacks and to reduce their numbers through careful management of their sexuality. This, I argued in the book, was racism’s cutting edge in the early twentieth century.Since publishing the book, I have done some work on the changes in practices of racism in the wake of the Biological Synthesis—that is, the unification of biology and genetics that occurred in the 1930s through the efforts of renowned scientists such as Theodosius Dobzhansky and Ernst Mayr (McWhorter 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). As I discussed in that work, by 1950, evolutionary biology was less a study of species development than it was a study of the effects of evolutionary forces acting on and within populations. Correlatively, racial practices shifted toward management of statistically delineated populations or ethnic groups. Theorists and policymakers recognized that not all members of a given population have the same genes, meaning that old-style racism (which assumed, for example, that all Negroes were stupid) was false; some Negroes might be quite brilliant, in fact. It was not The Negro who was stupid but the population of Negroes in the aggregate that was measurably stupider than the population of Anglo-Saxons. Accordingly, normalization now occurred at the level of the population. Disciplinary practices designed for cultivating the capacities of groups of individuals were altered or replaced to focus on groups as groups, as aggregates. The point was to shift the statistical norm of the population rather than to alter the bodies or behavior of each and every individual. I have argued elsewhere (McWhorter 2009a, 5) that this merger of disciplinary normalization and population management constitutes the full flowering of what Foucault calls biopower (Foucault 1978, 140).When Lisa Guenther invited me to speak at the plenary on “Re-thinking Whiteness” that took place at the fifth annual meeting of philoSOPHIA at Vanderbilt University, she explained that although many presenters offer polished papers, it has been a... (shrink)

This begins before 1896. This begins before Arkansas. But “this can't be right grandmother. who are our Ancestors! she said, shit gal, i don't know”. One of my ancestors walks toward me. She be Gertrude. Gertrude Grant. I have no pictures of her. I have no living memories of her. Yet I remember. Her. My Nana's mama, born around 1890 in the lumber town of Canfield in southern Arkansas.Canfield, Arkansas, 1896We're childrenBabies reallywhen the fires startA mob is always ready to (...) takeour wagesRun us awayAlways ready to lynch usWhen a volley of shotsbe my lullabiesI won't live to see 36I learn about the Canfield Race War of 1896 through online searches, old newspaper clippings, doctoral dissertations. Great-Grandma Gertrude would have been around six when the rioting happened, when white laborers became jealous of Black laborers and tried to push them, beat them, burn them out of town. Free library access to census documents and land deeds tells me that Gertrude's daddy, James W. Grant, purchased eighty acres of land in Canfield on February 1, 1893, perhaps thanks to the Southern Homestead Act, which made millions of acres of land available to homesteaders, including migrating and free Negroes. James and his wife, Susie A. Lewis, raised their children on their land in Canfield. How did the riots affect them, their land, their kin, their safety, their daily lives? I ask all the questions. I was raised with the permission to ask all the questions. I ask all the questions before I'm trained in the academy to ask all the questions. (shrink)

But Williams had created a field of historical study, where his white counterparts had not. Single-handedly and without the blessing or approval of the academic community, Williams had called attention to the importance of including Afro-Americans in any acceptable and comprehensive history of the nation long before the historians of various groups of European-Americans or Asian-Americans had begun to advocate a similar treatment for their groups. And if Williams did not impress the white professional historians, he gave heart and encouragement (...) to future Afro-American historians. When the History of the Negro Troops appeared in 1887, nineteen-year-old W. E. B. Du Bois was a college senior at Fisk University and editor-in-chief of the student magazine, The Fisk Herald. In the columns of the Herald Du Bois wrote, "At last we have a historian; not merely a Negro historian, but a man who judged by his merits alone has written a splendid narrative. The Herald congratulates George W. Williams, and the race, which may justly be . . . [proud] of him."1 Many years later, Carter G. Woodson, the founder of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History and of the Journal of Negro History, described Williams' History of the Negro Troops as "one of the most valuable accounts of the Civil War."2 With words like these from Du Bois and Woodson, on whose shoulders much of the second stage of Afro-American historiography would rest, it is not too much to say that George Washington Williams was responsible for the beginnings of Afro-American historiography. · 1. The Fisk Herald, January 1888, p. 8.· 2. Woodson's appraisal of Williams was found among his papers and made available to me by Dr. Charles H. Wesley when he was executive director of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, which had been founded by Woodson in 1915. John Hope Franklin, president-elect of the American Historical Society, has written a biography of George Washington Williams. He is the John Matthews Manly Distinguished Service Professor of History at the University of Chicago and the author of, among other works, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans and A Southern Odyssey: Travelers in the Antebellum North. (shrink)

“Seguramente, hasta hoy no creía que no aumentará de peso ni se achicará al aumentar la velocidad de la nave, ni que lo que es ahora para usted ya pasó para Fulano y aún no ocurrió para Zutano, ¿verdad? Desengáñese, porque el autor de este libro, nada menos que profesor de astrofísica relativista y autoridad mundial en agujeros negros y otros portentos, le hará dudar de todo eso” (del prólogo de Mario Bunge). -/- -/- “Como Borges —escribe el autor—, he (...) sentido que el del tiempo es el problema esencial de la metafísica de Occidente. Lo he estudiado durante más de 30 años. Me convertí en físico relativista por este problema. Y jamás rechacé la metafísica, como otros colegas, que, borrachos de ignorancia, desprecian lo que ignoran. Estudié lógica, semántica, ontología, epistemología. A veces los medios se transformaron en fines, y publiqué abundantemente filosofía. Siempre fui un outsider: un científico para los filósofos, un astrónomo para los físicos, un físico para los astrónomos. No me quejo: me evité lo peor de todos esos mundos”. -/- . (shrink)

Em um mundo marcado pelo hedonismo, materialismo e individualismo, os cristãos são convidados a dar testemunho de amor e de serviço, apontando à realidade que ultrapassa os horizontes humanos e oferece o verdadeiro sentido da existência. Este testemunho, por sua vez, pauta-se no acolhimento do amor e serviço de Deus para conosco, conforme nos ensina a literatura joanina. João nos ensina que Deus é o primeiro no amor e nos dá a graça de vivenciarmos o amor, em nossa vida cotidiana, (...) na forma de serviço. (shrink)

In this paper, we revisit the debate surrounding the Unfolding Argument (UA) against causal structure theories of consciousness (as well as the hard-criteria research program it prescribes), using it as a platform for discussing theoretical and methodological issues in consciousness research. Causal structure theories assert that consciousness depends on a particular causal structure of the brain. Our claim is that some of the assumptions fueling the UA are not warranted, and therefore we should reject the methodology for consciousness science that (...) the UA prescribes. First, we briefly survey the most popular philosophical positions in consciousness science, namely physicalism and functionalism. We discuss the relations between these positions and the behaviorist methodology that the UA assumptions express, despite the contrary claim of its proponents. Second, we argue that the same reasoning that the UA applies against causal structure theories can be applied to functionalist approaches, thus proving too much and deeming as unscientific a whole range of (non-causal structure) theories. Since this is overly restrictive and fits poorly with common practice in cognitive neuroscience, we suggest that the reasoning of the UA must be flawed. Third, we assess its philosophical assumptions, which express a restrictive methodology, and conclude that there are reasons to reject them. Finally, we propose a more inclusive methodology for consciousness science, that includes neural, behavioral, and phenomenological evidence (provided by the first-person perspective) without which consciousness science could not even start. Then, we extend this discussion to the scope of consciousness science, and conclude that theories of consciousness should be tested and evaluated on humans, and not on systems considerably different from us. Rather than restricting the methodology of consciousness science, we should, at this point, restrict the range of systems upon which it is supposed to be built. (shrink)

In evolutionary psychology, it is customary to measure life-history via psychometric inventories such as the Arizona Life History Battery. The validity of this approach has been questioned: it is argued that these measures are not congruent with biological life history events, such as the number of children, age at first birth, or pubertal timing. However, empirical data to test this critique are lacking. We therefore administered the ALHB to a convenience sample of young adults in Serbia. We also collected information (...) on psychosocial-biodemographic life history parameters closely related to biological life history traits: pubertal timing, onset of sexual behavior, short- and long-term mating, number of children, timing of reproduction, parenthood values, and environmental harshness. We found that correlations between these two sets of measures were rare, unsystematic, and mostly low in magnitude. Stable patterns of relations emerged only between the indicators of environmental conditions from both sets of measures. Furthermore, some ALHB indicators were found to be positively related with early fertility, which is incongruent with the conceptual foundation of ALHB. Finally, network analysis and factor analysis within each set of measures revealed different structures and that the hypothesis of unidimensionality, on which the ALHB was founded, cannot be applied to psychosocial-biodemographic life history indicators. Our results support the critique of ALHB as a set of measures lacking validity to capture biodemographic life-history parameters. ALHB measures are indeed relevant for understanding life-history variation, but they cannot be used as a substitute for specific life history characteristics. Our findings are a warning to researchers to use direct measures of biological events in order to measure life-history dynamics. (shrink)

In this paper we present theoretical and experimental evidence for a set of mechanisms by which intention is understood. We propose that three basic aspects are involved in the understanding of intention. The first aspect to consider is intention recognition, i.e., the process by which we recognize other people’s intentions, distinguishing among different types. The second aspect concerns the attribution of intention to its author: the existence of shared neural representations provides a parsimonious explanation of how we recognize other people’s (...) intentions , but in and of itself, is not sufficient to determine who the agent is. Once the intention has been recognized and attributed to an agent, the reasons for, and the aim of, the intention are to be considered. Hence, the third aspect concerns the aim-intention motivating the execution of a certain action. We discuss the neural basis of these three theoretical aspects suggesting a conceptual synthesis. (shrink)

O presente artigo trata da arte de escutar, apontando sua carência em nosso cotidiano, assim como alguns dos obstáculos a seu cultivo. Demonstra o quanto a filosofia clínica se faz necessária devido a tal carência, e levanta a hipótese de um papel relevante para a escuta atenta ao trabalho do sacerdote, assim como a possibilidade dele, através de seu trabalho, suscitá-la na comunidade.

The arrival of Buddhism to Uruguay is related to various historical and cultural factors, such as the democratic opening at eighties, the progressive globalization in the country, the break of post (modernism) with a hegemonic rationalist-positivist model, the emergence of so-called New Religious Movements and opening of goods symbolic-religious markets, generally aimed at middle and upper social strata with economic and cultural capital is conducive to the proposed use of existential and introspective way of life. In this paper we analyze (...) the arrival of the different Buddhist lineages in Uruguay (Tibetan and Japanese), and the historical and socio-cultural context which activates their emergency. (shrink)

Santiago Maldonado desapareció el 1° de agosto de 2017 durante la represión que Gendarmería Nacional realizó en la localidad de Cushamen, en la provincia de Chubut, contra la protesta de la comunidad mapuche en la que Maldonado participaba. El sur argentino tiene una larga experiencia de reclamos del pueblo mapuche centrados en recuperar las tierras que consideran ancestrales, lograr la autonomía jurisdiccional y alcanzar el reconocimiento de libertad económico - productiva y de su identidad cultural. El 1° de agosto de (...) 2017, la Gendarmería ingresó al Pu Lof en Resistencia de Cushamen dado que el Movimiento Autónomo de Puel Mapu había cortado durante 24 horas la ruta 40, que recorre Argentina paralela a la cordillera de los Andes, para reclamar la liberación de su líder Facundo Jones Huala, detenido un mes antes en la provincia de Rio Negro. La Gendarmería Nacional había recibido orden de la justicia federal para despejar la ruta 40 pero, una vez que la cumplió, ingresó también a la comunidad de manera ilegal. La desaparición de Santiago Maldonado fue denunciada de forma inmediata por la comunidad, para luego, convertirse en el reclamo central de los organismos de Derechos Humanos y de diversas organizaciones políticas. Maldonado estuvo 78 días desaparecido hasta el hallazgo de su cadáver, sumergido en el Río Chubut, durante un rastrillaje que los buzos de la Prefectura realizaron, rio arriba respecto del lugar de la represión. La movilización social, política, jurídica y mediática que se produjo durante el tiempo que Maldonado estuvo desaparecido reflejó cómo la Historia Reciente argentina continúa abierta, se hizo evidente la presencia del pasado en el presente y las disputas sociales y políticas que de ello se desprenden. Más precisamente, quedaron expuestas las memorias en conflicto en torno a lo ocurrido durante la última Dictadura militar en Argentina y a la violación a los derechos humanos mediante la desaparición forzada y el Terrorismo de Estado. En este contexto, y entendiendo que los medios de comunicación son una herramienta clave donde se producen esas luchas por la memoria como proyección de discusiones y conflictos más profundos, el objetivo del presente trabajo radica en analizar cómo se presentó la desaparición y muerte de Santiago Maldonado en la prensa escrita argentina, ¿A qué imaginarios responde y qué significados tiene esa conceptualización?, ¿Qué luchas sobre el pasado reciente argentino visibilizó?, y ¿Qué posiciones se intentaron legitimar con su utilización pública?. Para dar respuesta a estos interrogantes se analizarán los diarios La Nación y Página 12 (versiones digitales) observando la existencia de una lucha por los sentidos del pasado que pugnó por el significado de la desaparición y de la muerte de Santiago Maldonado. Si bien se entiende que dichos periódicos no agotan las líneas de análisis del caso, se seleccionaron como punto de inicio de la investigación en tanto constituyen publicaciones masivas dirigidas a perfiles de lectores disimiles donde pueden rastrearse las disputas por la memoria antes mencionadas. El foco de análisis estará puesto en los meses de la desaparición y muerte de Santiago Maldonado para reflejar la existencia de una lucha por los sentidos del pasado que pugnó por atribuirle diferentes significados al destino del joven. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Overtones:A CollagePaul Youngquist (bio)Mom leans against the keyboard of the old upright piano in the den. She puckers her lips and gently fingers the valves. A couple of times a month, she frees her trumpet from the purple velveteen lining its case—out of love or frustration I can never tell. She stares hard at the bell, pointed somewhere near my feet. She inhales deeply, pressing the silver mouthpiece to (...) her crumpled lips. A silent moment passes—torn by a noise pitched past the sun, a shrieking flare sound. Another follows and another, bright glissandos blinking out somewhere below middle C. They shatter everything I know about her. Everything I thought I knew. What sound was that, what cry? What aspiration to be free? After those initial stabs, she falls into familiar melodies: "Bugler's Holiday" by Leroy Anderson, maybe, or "When the Saints Go Marching In." I'm unsettled for the rest of the day.Trumpeter Don Cherry's sound unsettled me too. I was much older when I first encountered it on Ornette Coleman's The Shape of Jazz to Come. It took me back to Mom's cries. I heard her sound in his: bright, high, and transient: less pitch than smudge, transmitting unknowable overtones. On "Lonely Woman," for instance. Cherry states the plaintive melody in hazy unison with Coleman, blurs the third note, wavers and plays his peculiar temper, untimely and free to move beyond the platitudes of harmony until, after Coleman's baffled cry, he parts company to play a sixth above (if such language matters, and it doesn't), descending in half steps to resolve (not happily) on a minor third, Cherry now pitched below. Their unison breaks apart to reconverge, and the brief bridge feels like a heaving between sobs. This isn't music. It's too raw for the repartee of bebop or the sociability of swing. But everybody can feel it, which explains the scandal of Coleman and company's extended appearance in late 1959 at the Five Spot in New York's East Village. Writing in the New York Times Magazine years later, Joseph Hooper likened it to the furor erupting after Stravinsky's Paris premier of "The Rite of Spring" in 1913. In an interview with Terry Gross, Cherry remembers everyone who was musically anyone being there—from Leonard Bernstein to Thelonious Monk—to witness the sacrilege. The implacable trickster Charles Mingus appeared one [End Page 133] night with Phineas Newborn, a keyboard virtuoso famous for his perfect pitch. Newborn sat and stared at his cufflinks. He never played a note. After the set, Mingus barreled onto the stage and, with his long arms and big hands, crashed all the keys. "That's where it is," he bellowed. "It's all there." Everywhere and nowhere. Cherry and Ornette decentered intonation. They distempered tradition's scales. Afflicted with perfect pitch, Newborn couldn't follow their cries and whispers. They flew free from the comforting staff. Still you feel them, hear their immeasurable sound.Don Cherry: "I've always been on the outside, and that's a good quality for the music to have, like the wind in your face."Cherry's mother Daisy gave him his first horn when he was fourteen. It breathed life into him, offering a way to express sounds his body harbored. Born in Oklahoma City in 1936 to "Negro-Choctaw Indian parents" (his words—his mother's mother was half native), Cherry heard gospel, blues, and Indian songs from the start. The family's move to the Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles in 1940 only multiplied the sounds of diverse ethnicities mixed with the rumble of jazz from the Cherry Blossom, his father's club, where Don and his sister sometimes danced for dimes. His horn funneled all this sound—all the music he'd ever make—through a peculiarly powerful feeling: "that feeling to me, through as much music as I've learned, I still remember just that feeling when I first got that horn." What feeling exactly? "Infant happiness" (in-fant, not speaking). The feeling of life before language: "infant happiness, infant happiness, beautiful! That's what music is really... (shrink)

Dom Léger-Marie Deschamps élabora un système philosophique profondément subversif et novateur, intitulé : La Vérité, ou Le Vrai Système. Il s'agit d'une philosophie de la totalité, fondée sur une logique des contraires et du contradictoire. La métaphysique de Deschamps annonce l'avènement d'une nouvelle humanité, qui induit nécessairement une nouvelle société, dans lequel l'État, les lois, les idéologies, la religion, la propriété sont abolis, chacun étant égal à tous. Au XVIIIe siècle cette doctrine ne pouvait être diffusée sans risques très graves (...) pour son auteur: l'amitié et la protection du marquis de Voyer d'Argenson évitèrent à Dom Deschamps toute persécution. (shrink)

A história da linguagem adquire ao longo do Ensaio sobre a origem das línguas o andamento de uma queda acelerada na corrupção. Há uma língua primitiva que se degenera e se altera: um processo de formação e uma deformação. À medida que Rousseau identifica em suas reflexões – seja na origem seja na estrutura – música e linguagem, a perda de força expressiva que se verifica nas línguas acomete também a música e estas duas corrupções caminham juntas, de modo que (...) ambas se afastam da língua musicada ou da palavra cantada do início. A corrupção da música e das línguas corresponde ao apagamento de sua potência expressiva e refere-se a uma autonomização da harmonia artificial, ao aumento das consoantes, das articulações, da racionalidade, da prática da escrita, bem como ao desenvolvimento histórico, político, econômico e social. Todos estes processos devem ser levados em consideração numa análise sobre as línguas e a linguagem. Todavia, é possível isolar metodologicamente cada um deles. Dito isto, propomos neste artigo investigar o papel da escrita no processo de corrupção e degeneração das línguas. (shrink)

RESUMO Na flosofa de Rousseau expõe-se a paulatina construção de uma ideia ocidental de humanidade: a história de como o ser humano assim denominou-se ser, bem como a história do abuso dessa denominação. Trata-se, sobretudo, da crítica sobre a construção de um mito da dignidade exclusiva da natureza humana, tema que percorre as obras de diferentes flósofos, dos modernos aos contemporâneos, dos ocidentais aos não ocidentais. O presente artigo aborda, a partir de Rousseau e em diálogo com outros autores, o (...) “ciclo maldito” característico da modernidade, uma ideia que separa os humanos dos animais e segrega os humanos entre si. Começa-se por apartar o ser humano da natureza e constituí-lo como um ser à parte em um processo de monopolização progressiva do valor da existência: aparece em um primeiro momento o especismo, subsequentemente a desigualdade sociopolítica, o etnocentrismo e outras formas derivadas de exclusão. ABSTRACT In Rousseau’s philosophy, the gradual construction of a western idea of humanity is exposed: the history of how the human being naming himself being, as well as the history of the abuse of that denomination. It is, above all, a critique of the construction of the myth of the exclusive dignity of human nature, a theme that permeates the works of diferent philosophers, from the modern to contemporary ones, from western to non-western. This article discusses, based on Rousseau and in dialogue with other authors, the “cursed cycle” characteristic of modernity, an idea that separates humans from animals and segregates humans from each other. It starts with separating human being from nature and constituting him as a distinct part in a process of progressive monopolization of the value of existence: speciesism appears at frst, then sociopolitical inequality, ethnocentrism and other forms derived from exclusion. (shrink)

Perhaps it is best to begin on a semi-autobiographical note. In my liberal days, Mill's arguments in On Liberty for freedom of speech struck me as a paradigm of rationality: the force and eloquence of his presentation, I then thought, could not fail to impress themselves on any mature member of our species. But I am a Marxist now, and more and more of my former political beliefs now strike me as less and less tenable. It was considerations such as (...) the one that follows which have recently led me to modify drastically, and in some cases abandon entirely, my former political views vis à vis the question of freedom of speech.Whenever there is an ascendant class, a large portion of the morality of the country emenates from its class interests and its feelings of class superiority. The morality between Spartans and Helots, between planters and negroes, between princes and subjects, between nobles and returiers, between men and women, has been for the most part the creation of these class interests and feelings …. (shrink)

Uno dei principali scopi della riflessione filosofica sulla scienza è quello di formulare un criterio in grado di distinguere le scienze empiriche non solo dalle scienze formali (logica e matematica), ma anche e soprattutto dalle non-scienze, come la metafisica, la teologia, la religione, il mito e la pseudoscienza. Il problema della demarcazione è emerso con forza nei dibattiti sulle aspirazioni scientifiche di discipline come la psicoanalisi o la parapsicologia, ed è tornato recentemente di grande attualità anche per le sue importanti (...) ricadute culturali, politiche ed educative. Addentrandosi in questo affascinante terreno d’esplorazione filosofica, il volume riprende in modo rigoroso i termini del dibattito tra i neopositivisti (verificazionisti) e Popper (falsificazionista), mostra che entrambe le proposte sono incapaci di garantire un’adeguata distinzione tra scienza e non-scienza, ed infine propone la versione aggiornata di una terza soluzione, basata sulla teoria bayesiana della conferma. (shrink)

Après des siècles de développement parallèle, l’histoire des communautés humaines a connu un tournant majeur en 1492, l’expansion vers d’autres continents rendant les sociétés de plus en plus interdépendantes. Parvenue à l’ère planétaire, l’humanité mondialisée doit opérer une nouvelle évolution en instaurant une relation non destructrice avec la nature, afin de garantir sa propre survie.After centuries of parallel development, the history of human communities was a major turning point in 1492, expanding to other continents making companies increasingly interdependent. Reached in (...) the global era, humanity must make a global change by introducing a new non-destructive relationship with nature to ensure its own survival. (shrink)

continent. 2.3 (2012): 218–223 Vijay Prashad. Arab Spring, Libyan Winter . Oakland: AK Press. 2012. 271pp, pbk. $14.95 ISBN-13: 978-1849351126. Nearly a decade ago, I sat in a class entitled, quite simply, “Corporations,” taught by Vijay Prashad at Trinity College. Over the course of the semester, I was amazed at the extent of Prashad’s knowledge, and the complexity and erudition of his style. He has since authored a number of classic books that have gained recognition throughout the world. The Darker (...) Nations , a peoples’ history of the Third World, sent defibrillating shockwaves through an academic world that had almost forgotten the epic scope and historic dignity of the non-aligned movement and post-colonial struggles. In his recent, award-winning work, Arab Spring, Libyan Winter , Prashad delves into his capacious knowledge of the Third World to excavate the discourses and narratives surrounding the upheavals of 2011. “Revolutions have no specific timetable,” states Prashad in the opening line of this exciting and provocative look at contemporary events. Instantly, an atmosphere of suspense emerges. The reader is alerted to the problem of history. Does the making of history then involve a suspension of historical time, or is it a continuous narrative structure into which events must eventually be integrated? Arab Spring, Libyan Winter shows that the answer to the question, “How is history made?” lies just as easily in the asking. The first half of the book works through the events that transpired to bring about the explosive popular uprisings of Arab Spring: Tunisia and Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain. But the events are not put together in a cohesive, chronological fashion. Using an uncommonly gripping style more akin to the folk-story motif of the djeli than to traditionally Orientalist academia, Prashad suspends a given situation, points out its components, and traces back the characters and genealogies that define each link before resuming a narrative. Every moment is an end to itself, and an origin of something different. Thus, the making of history becomes the suspension of its own progress, it’s catastrophic 'stability,' in a process of differentiation through inclusion. Empirically, one might suggest that history is a condition of time, and by extension, of the subject, but history is also an eminent producer of the Subject and her concept of time through memory and narrative. Hence, history is often overdetermined by a dominant narrative of the sovereign. The apparently chaotic composition of Prashad’s historicity is, then, an interstitial morphology of resistance. It illustrates that the time to act for the revolutionary lies in the gaps within the dominant historical realities. It points out the sorties of signifiers constituting nothing in the obliterated ruins of history. Through such illuminations, Arab Spring, Libyan Winter breaks through “the surface of history” to elaborate revolution’s snapping synapses, exploding interruptions and breaches, connecting flows. Messianic Politics It is tempting to think, 'History is either singular, or it is diffuse. It is either one coherent factual narrative, or it is comprised of the aletheia of the multitude.' Yet the reader finds Prashad examining the structure of history on multiple levels. For Prashad, world history is shaped by geographically defined political movements, such as communism or national liberation, with historical agents like the working class for the former and the nationalist militant for the latter. Religion, however, is another matter: “Religion has an unshakable eschatology which a post-utopian secular politics lacks.” Within the telos of religion, there appears on the horizon the image of Benjamin’s thoughts on messianic time—time as “a small fissure in the continuous catastrophe,” a break with history, may contain an ultimate redemption of the human beyond the political power struggle. Succoring the split between geo-political and utopian-religious (messianic) time in the context of Arab Spring, Prashad indicates that the base of “the deep desire and commitment to some form of democracy” is forged by the affinity between eschatological Islamist politics with the People. To think about the Subject of messianic time in the context of the lack of a “coherent timetable” for emancipatory politics, it is perhaps best to return to the modern tradition of Martin Luther King, Jr., whose prefigurative blending of liberation theology and emancipatory politics became most important during his works of 1963, the climactic year of “The Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” the March on Washington, and the bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church. In “The Letter,” King states the point bluntly: Frankly, I have yet to engage in a direct-action campaign that was “well timed” in view of those who have not suffered unduly from the disease of segregation. For years now I have heard the word “wait!” It rings in the ear of every Negro with piercing familiarity. This “Wait” has almost always meant ‘Never.” We must come to see, with one of our distinguished jurists, that “justice too long delayed is justice denied.” The timing of rebellious action must not be a part of history. It must change history. The kairos appears spontaneous and untimely in its convulsive, shocking presence, yet it is, deeper still, a path, a longue durée , forged through diligent and rigorous praxis. King put a finer point on the path of historic liberation in his declaration in his 1963 speech at Western Michigan University: “[T]ime is neutral.... Somewhere along the way we must see that time will never solve the problem alone but that we must help time. Somewhere we must see that human progress never rolls in on the wheels on inevitability. It comes through the tireless efforts and the persistent work of dedicated individuals who are willing to be co-workers with God. Without this hard work, time itself becomes an ally of the insurgent and primitive forces of irrational emotionalism and social stagnation. We must always help time and realize that the time is always right to do right.” Time, then, exists in “the neutral,” while action must turn to the kairos , not only of taking time, but taking the right time. By turning our relation to time into kairos , we move time from its context within history to a duration between histories—the longue dure?e of Messianic time. The implementation of neutrality in this context suggests a broad space of time to extend through the valley of positive and negative. In Roland Barthes’s lectures from 1978, the neutral takes place in this minimal distance of non-conflict that exists outside of two extremes. It is, in the words of Maurice Blanchot, “the non-general, the non-generic, as well as the non-specific.” For Blanchot, the neutrality of time permeates life as death, impassive and beyond control; such is the neutrality of messianic time, which permeates the charge of history, changing the "I" into the "one." The neutrality of time therefore implicates history in a case against extremism, showing that the work of the radical is not to tend to any particular side, but to have the time to navigate through the terrible terrain of history by altering its course, its patterns and rhythms of movement, connection, sociality. Hence, one does not simply “make history,” one alters the course of history in accordance to “the right time.” The historical path toward emerging power is transmitted as a gesture to the outside of history, against history; a gesture as simple as reaching out. Thus a counterhistory, to use Foucault’s term, is brought forward as the guide of time past a point of no return, a Rubicon, the point where the normal path of history falls to the past. The subject, who must be the only true agent of history, facilitates time through helpfulness, and both the Subject and her history become decentered in relation to one another. Yet history negates the neutrality of time. As Barthes discloses, although the neutral is the “thought and practice of the nonconflictual, it is nevertheless bound to assertion, to conflict, in order to make itself heard.” Engaged with history, time is charged with a destiny, and becomes an opposition. As Prashad insists, “For Arab lands, the events of early 2011 were not the inauguration of a new history, but the continuation of an unfinished struggle that is a hundred years old.” The emergence of the Subject during Arab Spring did not conceive of a new history, but changed the path of history toward a different destiny. “Historical grievances combined with inflationary pressures now met with the subjective sense that victory might be at hand—this was not simply a protest to scream into the wind, but a protest to actually remove autocrats from their positions of authority. The facts of resistance had given way to the expectation of revolutionary change.” The negativity of this charge toward “revolutionary destiny” rendered control, as a positive force, seriously lacking. The lack of control lies in the problem that the Subject is not totally detemporalized or timeless, but untimely in her presence. The Subject is untimely, because her work is visionary, and it is only through such visionary work that the Rubicon can be crossed. Still, the crossing of this border is haunted by anxiety over an impending disaster that lays in wait. It is only through the form of what Benjamin calls divine violence, captivated not with the justice of the means, but the ends—the transformation of history—that a revelation of history’s traumatic foundations can be liberated, and patterns and rhythms of time developed throughout obscured traditions awakened. In this situation, the Subject appears to be outside of right, but setting the state to rights. Because her position is correct, in-so-far as the rebelling subject rebels due to a lack of recognition, her representation appears outside of the norm, which is mistaken as right. Therefore, such visionary work must be carried out through obscured traditions, underground, away from the surveillance of empire. Explaining his method from the start along the lines of Marx’s metaphor of the mole, Prashad insists, “It is the burrowing that is essential, not simply the emergence onto the surface of history.” Arab Spring, Libyan Winter is a book on uncharted networks of time, spread out over the 252 pages like an elaborate spider’s web of passages intertwining with and overwhelming the machinery of the state. Although untimely, Arab Spring was not a flash in the pan, or a Facebook or Twitter revolution. Prashad notes that the government’s suspension of these tools led to further radicalism by furthering communications through face-to-face encounters. In existential terms, Arab Spring might be thought of as a revolution of Being over techne , an uprising of the unchartable, infinite potential of the Other. The name of this Other is found in Chance. The faith of the revolution lies in the proper decentering of the subject, its giving to the Other of time, for only with respect to time does history actually appear on the horizon of the subject, rather than as an imposition. This time of historical agency appears as a moment when anything can happen—a revolutionary truth event where everything comes into question while being realized in its Otherness as a community of the people begins anew in the streets amidst discourse, friendship, reconfigurations of hegemony, and a becoming of a constituent power. Throwing a wrench into the gears of the “cobwebbed tradition” of Orientalism, the decentering of history in Arab Spring, Libyan Winter is a defining quality of its impassioned revolutionary cry. But perhaps the most paradigmatic points of the book emerge from the unexpected voices. To make the connection between the particular manifestations of revolutionary demands to the general historic terms of revolution, Prashad quotes an anonymous young Egyptian in Tahrir Square, who reminds us, “[T]he French Revolution took a very long time so the people could eventually get their rights.” Far from timelessness, the historicization of Arab Spring must exist precisely within the most uncanny appearance of time, as something that does not appear to come from the natural state of time as we know it, but in arriving has completely transformed the way that we understand time. Strange Monsters Revolution is never as simple as a revolt from below against a rusting structure of elites trying to remain in power. As with the French Revolution, Arab Spring consisted of complex familial ties, outside interests, and religious factions fighting alongside, often in awkward juxtaposition to, liberals, working class parties, farmers, and students. It is perhaps because of this historically difficult and incongruous composition that the Arabic word for revolution is thawra , referring to the image of the bull, or thawr , which has religious significance as a pagan deity for the Ancient Semitic tribes and Cartheginians. If Daniel Guérin was correct in saying, “Anarchism and Marxism drink from the same spring,” then it is quite a different oasis that drove the thirsty beast of revolution through what Prashad calls, “the Libyan labyrinth.” Recalling Bataille’s Acéphale, the intestinal labyrinth gains significance as the mode of metabolism and rumination in which, “(the Acephale) has lost himself, loses me with him, and in which I discover myself as him, in other words, as a monster.” Unraveling the discourse of the revolution, the flows of power and hegemony—from Qaddafi’s nationalist coup in 1969 to the wars with Chad from 1978 to 1987, the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s to, finally, the War on Terror—we find that the metabolic process of Libyan Winter ends in the production of oil. In a process of what Prashad calls “involution,” Qaddafi’s bellicose policies, along with his attempts to nationalize Islam together with oil, mutated the source of his power, turning his house against itself. Already a divided nation, with its two major cities on opposite geographic sides of the country, Libya became split between two opposed political powers—liberal reformists and staunch nationalists—as Qaddafi’s political disengagement manifested through what can only be described in psychoanalytic terms as a recursive passage a l’act (mysteriously calling Wikipedia “Kleenex,” declaring that opponents drank hallucinogens with their instant coffee, and so on). Prashad declares, “The mercurial style that Qaddafi adopted was not about his personality alone, but also a leader’s natural response to a system that relied upon power brokers whose own loyalty… did not have any ideological commitment to the system.” As in the case of other nations during Arab Spring, the true expression of revolt was an outward exposition of what had inwardly been happening in microcosmic societies throughout the realm—from indigenous tribes to political parties, for a century, the people, partly motivated by (and in resistance to) economic impositions of development, had been changing the traditional social compositions and participating in what Ruth Wilson Gilmore calls, “the relative autonomy of the movement from the leaders.” It was this empowerment of political reconfigurations taking place under the context of new democratic assemblages that shocked the elites and evoked such a powerful response. Unlike Qaddafi’s awkward policy choices and rants, real acts of power from the West were clear and decisive. Prashad sets the stages of war and diplomacy, far removed from the deserts, mountains, and cities that forged the backdrop of popular politics. Taking place under the now-classic architecture of the “four pillars” of US interests—oil, the War on Terror, Israel, and the circumvention of Iranian hegemony—we find elites rubbing elbows in “Heliopolist cocktail parties and hushed conferences in Kasr al-Ittihadiya” as well as the Concorde-Lafayette hotel in Paris, which provides the setting for a meeting of anti-Qaddafi figures consolidating their power. These scenes are buttressed with the careful portraiture of key historical actors. As Prashad brings the stage of history to life, we find the diplomats and liberals like Frank Wisner, whose career has brought him from Enron in the late 1990s to the Obama Administration, under the aegis of which he was meeting with Mubarak about military support during Arab Spring. We spy the provocateurs, for instance, gauche cavalier , Bernard Henri-Levy, who telephones Sarkozy from Benghazi about the need for more NATO air strikes. We follow the rebel military establishment as it suffers mysterious deaths and even more mysterious assents (like that of apparent CIA cohort, Khalifa Hifter). In each of these intriguing characters, we find different representations of the security state biopolitique: an oil-injected reification that drives Arab Spring from the resentment of rising food prices to the brink of implosion in Libyan Winter. Reminiscent of the scenes of Cold War soirées represented in old Bond films, the aristocratic fight for oil against democracy that was Libyan Winter presents a harsh truth that the new global crisis is simply the continuation of the old history: the global exploitation of capitalism waged against the imagination of the people. As Benjamin laments, “The labyrinth is the right path for the person who always arrives early enough at his destination. This destination is the marketplace.” Yet, “(t)he labyrinth is the habitat of… a humanity (a class) which does not want to know where its destiny is taking it.” Thus, the labyrinth leads, like the desert, only further into itself. As Blanchot explains, “The desert is even less certain than the world; it is never anything but the approach to the desert.” Only the visionary can take time out of the involution toward oblivion. It is here, in this approach to and escape from history, that we find ourselves within Benjamin’s Golgotha, Blanchot’s desert: A space of indeterminate uncertainty where we become familiar only with our own exile. Blanchot writes, “For the moderated and moderate man, the room, the desert, and the world are strictly determined places. For the man of the desert and the labyrinth, devoted to the error of a journey necessarily a little longer than his life, the same space will be truly infinite, even if he knows that it is not, all the more so since he knows it.” The desert, as allegory, provides an eschatology, a mortality in the destiny of Arab Spring. But any allegory of nature might lead to a labyrinthine eschatology (for example, in Bachelard, the forest presents "a limitless world"); the prescience of the untimely is always an uncanny acceptance of the infinite within the finite—the outside of what is understood. Transgenerational and occupied with the image of the future, the untimely makes otherness its home as it proceeds toward liberation. In the work of helping time navigate this dangerous passage of history, Prashad illustrates that the more violent break with history may have occurred in the peaceable struggles of Tahrir Square, and not in the military clashes of Qaddafi with his former Generals who defected to the CIA and NATO countries. It might be possible to suggest, then, that in the case of Tunisia and Egypt, the historical subject of the people was drawn together in a Dionysian dance of different rhythms in the marvelous realm of the ancients, while we fear that the case of Libya suggests an Apollonian future where time, itself, may lay dying under the machinic hand of history. The properly Nietzschean inversion would follow: time is dead, for history has killed it. Yet, if time is dead, struck down in Golgotha, exposed in the desert, mauled by the thawra , it is only in the present sense that it is rendered impossible outside of the context into which the untimely has thrown us. Thus, if history becomes an art of revolution, life as being-towards-death (death as the provocation of the neutrality of time) becomes what Benjamin calls “the allegory of resurrection” through the glorious ruins of history. Prashad ends his work with a rousing finale: “The time of the impossible has presented itself. In Egypt, where the appetite for the possibilities of the future are greatest, the people continue to assert themselves into Tahrir Square and other places, pushing to reinvigorate a Revolution that must not die… For them the slogan is simple: Down with the Present. Long live the Future. May it be so.&rdquo. (shrink)

Neste texto me aproximo de táticasde travessia do Mundo Ordenadopara o Mundo Implicado atravésda imagem cinematográfica, es-pecificamente das que emergemno contexto dos cinemas negrosno Brasil contemporâneo. Partin-do da filosofia de Denise Ferreirada Silva, aproximo-me das possi-bilidades de destruição do mundocomo o conhecemos e dos seuscárceres estéticos e analíticos,a exemplo dos engendrados porJoão Carlos Rodrigues no livro ONegro Brasileiro e o Cinema. Porfim, volto-me às imagens de Tra-vessia, filme de Safira Moreira,pensando como ele executa ges-tos de imageação de um Mundo ede (...) um Cinema Implicado. (shrink)